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Introduction
Before the collapse of Lehman Brothers, monetary policy was typically implemented by setting the short-term interest rate. The aggressive policy response to the collapse drove the short-term interest rate down to its zero lower bound (ZLB), eliminating all possibility of additional economic stimulus through conventional operating instruments. Since then, the Federal Reserve's Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has engaged systematically in alternative strategies to support consumption and investment by making financial conditions more accommodative and exerting downward pressure on bond yields. In general, these policies have involved large-scale asset purchases -i.e. Quantitative Easing and the Maturity Extension Program -and communication of the Fed's intended degree of future policy accommodation -i.e. forward guidance.
The effects of the unconventional policies on the yields of different financial assets have been assessed in a substantial empirical literature employing event study methodology. The general finding is that both Treasury and corporate bond yields dropped significantly in concomitance with the announcement and the implementation of such policy measures. See, for instance, Gagnon et al. (2011) , Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011 ), Swanson (2011 ), Campbell et al. (2012 , and Kool and Thornton (2012) , Hamilton and Wu (2012) , Del Negro et al. (2013) . Event study methodology is a powerful tool for quantifying the immediate effects of policy communication and realization but not for assessing their persistence. The working hypothesis of event studies is that new information is incorporated into the prices of financial assets immediately and permanently (for a comprehensive recent discussion of event study methodology see Gurkaynak and Wright, 2013) .
We complement event studies by analyzing the way in which agents updated their expectations for the yields of Treasury and corporate securities embedding different degrees of credit risk in response to announcements of non-standard measures. By analyzing market expectations over different forecasting horizons, we assess not only the immediate effects of the policies but also their expected persistence.
We measure market expectations using the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (see Croushore, 1993) . Near the middle of every quarter, the survey participants give their forecasts of several variables over various horizons. We quantify the effects of policy announcements on forecasters' expectations by examining how individual forecasters revised their bond yield projections. The focus on revisions of expectations serves to isolate the unexpected component of bond rate changes. However, given the relatively wide time window between surveys -one quarter -the changes could be due to many concurrent factors. We tackle this issue by controlling for the perceived changes in the current macroeconomic environment. Our empirical methodology is based on two identifying assumptions: that ECB Working Paper 1951 , August 2016 professional forecasters believe policy interventions are transmitted to bond yields immediately but affect expectations for growth and inflation only after one quarter; and that policy makers do not respond contemporaneously to changes in forecasters' beliefs about bond yields in the current quarter. Similar assumptions have been used commonly in time series econometrics to identify exogenous changes in standard monetary policy actions (Sims, 1982; Bernanke and Mihov, 1998; Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 1999) .
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes the main policy actions taken by the Federal Reserve in response to the financial crises and evaluates their effectiveness through event studies. Section 3 quantifies agents' beliefs concerning the impact on bond yields of the unconventional policy measures. Section 4 concludes.
Non-standard measures at zero lower bound
The events that we consider are the Federal Reserve's announcements of non-standard monetary policy measures after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Starting late in 2008, the Fed announced a series of unconventional policies, including three rounds of quantitative easing and the Maturity Extension Program, also known as "Operation Twist". In addition to large-scale asset purchases, following the crisis the FOMC also relied increasingly on communication, i.e. forward guidance.
Monetary policy did not become less accommodative until 2013, when the economic outlook improved. The change in the degree of intended monetary policy accommodation began with the announcements of tapering-off and portfolio downsizing by the Fed. The amount of monthly purchases was decreased steadily until late 2014, when the Fed announced that it would terminate its large-scale asset purchases (LSAP). 1 We identify a total of twenty-three policy events corresponding to the announcements of the various unconventional measures (summarized in the first two columns of Table 1 ). For the first round of Quantitative Easing (QE1), we consider the eight events identified in Gagnon et al. (2011) : the initial announcement, the Chairman's speech of December 1, 2010, and selected subsequent FOMC meetings. For the second round (QE2), we take the five events analyzed by Wright (2012), namely FOMC meetings and selected speeches by the Chairman. For the Maturity Extension Program (MEP), we identify four events: the official policy announcement (September 21, 2011) and three subsequent meetings at which the FOMC reiterated its intention of continuing the Program. 2 For the third round of Quantitative Easing (QE3) we identify two events, namely the release on August 22, 2012, of the FOMC's July minutes, where the Federal Reserve first signaled that it was considering an additional round of Quantitative Easing, and the official announcement of the new round on September 13, 2012. Finally, we analyze three events related to the taperingoff (TAP): the actual announcement (December 18, 2013) , and two previous official communications anticipating a possible reduction in the pace of asset purchases (May 22 and June 19, 2013) .
In addition to large-scale asset purchases, the FOMC's communications after the crisis increasingly relied on forward guidance. After the onset of the financial crisis, almost every FOMC statement makes explicit reference to the expected macroeconomic outlook, the future policy measures, and the likely path of the short-term rate (see Campbell et al. 2012) . Forward guidance has likely empowered the other non-standard policy packages, possibly strengthening some of their channels of accommodation.
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We measure the effect of non-standard monetary policies by event study analysis (Gurkaynak and Wright, 2013) around the dates of our selected announcement dates. Specifically, we quantify the changes in the 10-year Treasury bond yields (constant-maturity), and the Moody's indexes of AAA and BAA corporate bond yields over a 2-day event window. 3 The thesis is that gauging the impact of the measures on the yields of both Treasury and corporate bonds featuring different credit quality can help us determine whether the policies affected financial instruments other than those directly purchased.
In practice, the estimates are made by regressing the daily changes in selected bond yields on a set of event dummies. To control for other potential confounding factors, we include in the regression the surprise component of a broad set of market-moving macroeconomic releases, including both hard data (such as non-farm payroll, retail sales and GDP) and soft data (consumer and manufacturing surveys). "Surprises" are defined as the difference between the data released during the event-window days and the consensus forecasts collected immediately beforehand. More specifically, the regression takes the following form:
where t indexes days and the dependent variable (Δ ) is the daily change in bond yields (10-year Treasury bonds and AAA and BAA corporate bonds). , denotes a set of event-dummy variables, each taking value 1 at the date of the policy announcement selected and 0 otherwise. For each of the macroeconomic indicators, , is equal to the surprise component of the variable . Specifically, if the macroeconomic indicator is not released on day the variable is set equal to 0.
Otherwise, it is defined as the difference between the data released on day and the consensus forecasts collected before the release. 4
The effect of the policy announcement for each of the 23 events over a 2-day window is measured by the sum . 5 For the most part, past event studies have not controlled for macroeconomic surprises, a procedure corresponding, in our case, to setting the  coefficients to 0.
In this case, the effect of the announcement corresponds to the change in bond yields between the (end of the) day before the announcement and (the end of) the day after it.
Our estimates are by Ordinary Least Squares, and statistical significance is assessed by heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The sample period is from the start of January 2007 to the end of March 2014.
Columns 3, 6, and 8 of Table 1 report the results of the event study "controlling" for macroeconomic news. The estimates not controlling for it are given in Columns 2, 5, and 7; we call these estimates "classical" because previous event studies have omitted these controls.
The results indicate that non-conventional policies had statistically significant and economically important effects on US Treasury and corporate bonds. The first round of policy actions in the wake of the Lehman Brothers collapse had the strongest impact: the cumulative effect of QE1 reduced the yields on 10-year Treasury bonds by about one percentage point and those on corporate bonds by three-fourths of a point. The next two rounds of asset purchases had somewhat less pronounced but still substantial effects: yields on Treasury bonds declined by a total of onethird and one-half of a percentage point around the announcement dates of QE2 and MEP, respectively. And interestingly, although these two programs were for Treasury paper only, their announcements were associated with an appreciable decline of a quarter of a point in corporate bond yields as well. The last round of QE produced less of an impact on yields, while the announcements on the tapering-off of the purchase programs were associated with substantial increases in both Treasury and corporate bond yields. Overall, these findings suggest that the unconventional measures had a considerable impact on the prices of financial assets, substantially lowering the cost of market financing for the government and for firms.
The inclusion of macroeconomic surprises affects the results only marginally. This suggests that when our selected events occurred, the bond markets were dominated by monetary policy announcements and not by macroeconomic surprises.
Non-standard measures and forecasters' beliefs
In the foregoing we used high-frequency event study methodology to quantify the immediate effect of policy announcements. Now we complement that study by assessing the impact of our policy events on the predictions of professional forecasters for Treasury and corporate bond yields, at different horizons.
The data are collected by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia in its Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF), which offers comprehensive information on the expectations of each forecaster surveyed for many macroeconomic indicators, including bond yields, at different horizons. 6 It is quarterly, with panelists submitting their predictions around the middle of every quarter. Following the convention of the SPF, we date survey rounds according to the quarter of the submission.
In order to quantify the perceived effect of the unconventional policies, we analyze the way in which individual forecasters revise their predictions for bond yields between consecutive rounds of the survey. We match each round of policy measures to exactly one inter-SPF period, namely the period between two consecutive survey response deadlines. The inter-SPF periods are shown in the last column of Table 1 , and the match with policy measures is shown as shaded. It is evident that the policy events associated with any given policy round mostly fall within one inter-SPF period. A notable exception is QE1, whose policy events went on for an entire year; some events associated with the MEP and Tapering also fall outside one period. This might possibly create a distortion, especially as regards QE1, since we omit the FOMC announcement of March 18, 2009, which nevertheless did contribute to the cumulative impact of QE1, as is observed in Section 2 (Table 1) . 7
The reliability of these matches is confirmed by Google trends data. We take the number of Google queries as an indication of the general interest in each non-standard measure stemming from media discussions, economic releases, and official communications. 1993) . 7 One way to address this problem would be to lengthen the inter-SPF periods. For QE1, in fact, we also included the period ending in mid-May 2009. This did not change the results significantly, so we elected to maintain the one-on-one match of one policy measure with one inter-SPF round. 8 We searched for "operation twist" instead of the official name of the policy because the media used it extensively. "Maturity extension program" did not yield enough search volume to produce a report. standard measure, the shaded area represents the corresponding inter-SPF evaluation period. It is evident that the relevant search intensity peaks during the period taken for analysis, offering evidence for our identification of the survey rounds.
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In order to measure changes in agents' beliefs, we define forecast revisions as the difference between the forecasts for calendar quarter reported in the survey round of quarter v t and the forecast for the same period ( ) taken from the previous quarter's survey, v t 1.
In other words, the forecast revision made by forecaster is defined as the difference between the forecast quarters ahead reported in the survey of quarter v t and the forecast 1 quarters ahead made in the previous survey, conducted in quarter v t 1. That is, the calendar quarter to which the forecast refers is fixed; what changes is the reporting period, hence the professional forecasters' information set. In the absence of news during the inter-SPF period, individual forecasters' revisions should be zero. the effects of the non-standard policies but also those of other, contemporary confounding factors.
For example, downward revisions might reflect any news that could be expected to reduce inflation or economic growth. To deal with this problem of endogeneity, we control for current-quarter revisions in the forecasts of inflation and growth.
Specifically, we estimate this equation:
where the dependent variable Ry , is the revision of the forecast for yields on different bonds: 10- The vector Z , Rg , , Rπ , , Rr , contains the revision of current-quarter forecasts for real GDP growth ( ), CPI inflation ( ), and the 3-month T-bill rate ( ). As stated above, the inclusion of revisions to inflation and growth forecasts is intended to net out the effects of other factors, unrelated to unconventional policy, that simultaneously affect both bond yield expectations and the macroeconomic outlook. By including the short-term interest rate, we net out the effects of standard monetary policy. The constant term is not included in the regression, since forecasters are assumed not to revise their predictions persistently in the same direction. The error term , represents the change in the expectations for bond yields that is not accounted for by currentquarter developments in prices, output, and the short-term interest rate. , 2005; Giannone, et al., 2015) . Notice that only current-quarter macro forecasts are included as independent variables; we do not control for macro forecasts at longer horizons in order to avoid the problems stemming from the simultaneity of expected bond yields and expected longer-run GDP growth and inflation.
Our methodology is designed in such a way as to quantify the effects of announcements on yield expectations as reflected in surveys. This contrasts with a number of papers that examine the effects of announcements on actual yields (see Wright, 2012) . The advantage of taking expectations rather than actual outcomes is the possibility of measuring the dynamic effects of each policy event separately. The countervailing drawback is that expectations as revealed in surveys could theoretically be distorted by herd behavior, strategic considerations, or forecasters' limited ability to process information (see Marinovic, 2013) . Additional distortions could derive from informational rigidities (see Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2012) . In practice, however, the predictions of professional forecasters are fairly accurate and compare well with institutional forecasts, such as those of the Federal Reserve staff (see D'Agostino and Whelan, 2008) and with those generated by state-of-the-art econometric models (Del Negro and Schorfheide, 2012; Giannone et al., 2008) .
Figure 3 reports the estimates of the distribution across individuals of the perceived effects on
Treasury and corporate bond yields of each non-standard policy at each forecasting horizon . Table 2 reports the effects averaged across individuals, in columns (2), (4), and (6); for symmetry with the event study reported earlier, we also report the estimates without controls, in columns (1),
(3), and (5). In the latter case, equation (3) is estimated with only the five policy-related dummies as independent variables and corresponds to the revisions to bond yield forecasts during the relevant inter-SPF quarter.
Insert Table 2 The accommodative monetary policies were also expected to exert significant downward pressure on corporate bonds. The magnitude of the change in the expectations for AAA-rated bond yields is comparable with that for government bond yields. For BAA-rated bonds, forecasters expected a more muted effect. This indicates that the non-standard measures not only reduced the yields on the assets directly purchased by the Fed but spilled over to the yields on other financial assets.
Comparing the results with and without controls for revisions to current-quarter forecasts of growth, inflation, and the short-term interest rate, it is evident that the bias due to this omission is sizeable for the first round of Quantitative Easing, but not for the subsequent rounds of unconventional policy. This suggests that the policy announcements were important events, whose effects were large and dominated the macroeconomic news within our selected inter-SPF periods. 13 Figure 3 also highlights the substantial heterogeneity of forecasters' beliefs concerning the size of the expected policy effect. The dispersion of beliefs increases as the horizon lengthens, indicating 11 A possible explanation could be the influence on professional forecasters' expectations for bond yields exerted by the government debt-ceiling crisis of early August 2011. 12 The evidence that the unconventional monetary policies had persistent effects on bond yields is in contrast with Wright (2012), who finds that they were short-lived. It is difficult to explain the differences in these results. In Wright (2012) the analysis is implicitly based on the revisions of model-based, rather than judgmental, forecasts. Moreover, Wright does not quantify the effects of each single round of policy separately but their average effects. 13 Not surprisingly, the results remain qualitatively unchanged when we include, as an additional control, the surprise component of all the market-moving macroeconomic data released during the inter-SPF quarter. See Appendix 2 for details. that there is greater disagreement over the effects of policy at longer horizons. There is also some (weak) evidence that disagreement tended to decrease as more unconventional policies were adopted. This is probably associated with market participants' learning of the impact of the policies and the Fed's resoluteness in pursuing them.
In addition, the moderation of disagreement is associated with the more intensive use of forward guidance. In particular, forecasters tended to concur more on the effects and the persistence of the policy event we label QE3, when the FOMC also announced more aggressive forward guidance by postponing the likely timing of the lift-off and by moving over to state-contingent forward guidance. A similar pattern of decreased disagreement was found for short maturities by Engen et al. (2014) and Andrade et al. (2015) .
Overall, our results suggest that the non-standard measures affected market expectations substantially and persistently. Significantly, they also affected professional forecasters' predictions for financial assets not directly purchased by the central bank.
Conclusions
We The solid black line that goes through the areas is the median of the forecasters' distribution for each quarter. The shaded areas comprise 50%, 68% and 90% of the distribution. The vertical gridlines represent the policy rounds and the quarters in which these policies were introduced (i.e., 2009:1, 2010:4, 2011:4, 2012:3, and 2013:3) . MEP=maturity extension program; QE3=quantitative easing 3; TAP=tapering. These graphs visualize the interquartile ranges (the box), the averages (the line inside the box), the maximum and the minimum values (the whisker), and the outliers (given a maximum whisker length "w", points are detected as outliers if they are higher than q3+w*(q3-q1) or lower than q1-w*(q3-q1), where q1 and q3 are the 25 th and 75 th percentiles, respectively). Note: the controlled event study refers to a regression model where the daily changes in bond yields are regressed on a set of event dummies and the surprise component of a large set of market-moving macroeconomic variables. The variables included in the estimation are: ECB main refinancing rate, ADP employment change, change in nonfarm payrolls, Chicago purchasing manager consumer confidence index, continuing claims, CPI net of food and energy, CPI, current account balance, durable goods orders, durables net of transport equipment, existing home sales, factory orders, FOMC rate decision, GDP annualized, GDP price index, housing starts, import price index, industrial production, initial jobless claims, ISM manufacturing, ISM non-manuf. composite, Markit US manufacturing PMI, monthly budget statement, new home sales, PCE core, pending home sales, personal income, personal spending, Philadelphia FED business outlook, PPI ex food and energy, PPI final demand, retail sales advance, retail sales net of auto, Richmond FED manufact. index, S&P/caseshiller 20-city index, trade balance, U. of Michigan sentiment, unemployment rate, and wholesale inventories. Results of the event study are based on a 2-day event window. Newey-West standard errors are used in the estimation. *, **, and *** denote F-test significance of abnormal returns at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. First, the model is estimated with the highest degree of cross-sectional heterogeneity: that is, separately for each individual (columns 1, 3, and 7) . The results are then aggregated via mean-group (see Pesaran and Smith, 1995) .
Second, the benchmark model is augmented with individual fixed effects (columns 2, 5, and 8)
controlling for all possible time-invariant characteristics of the forecasters (observable and not), in order to account for the fact that some forecasters might be present only during a short period that could be marked by movement of the yields always in the same direction. Fixed effects account for persistent biases that might arise from non-rationality, distorted incentives or specificities of the loss functions of individual forecasters. We have not used this specification as our benchmark model, because it implies that the forecasts could have a trend. And in any case, the fixed effects are not statistically significant and the results hold when they are removed from the model. Third, the model is estimated by adding as additional controls the surprise component of a large set of market-moving macroeconomic data that are released during the inter-SPF quarter (see Section 2). Since these data releases are more frequent than the survey, for each macroeconomic indicator the news is aggregated by cumulating all the news associated with each release between consecutive surveys.
Overall, the results obtained using the alternative specifications do not differ substantially from those with the benchmark procedure presented in the main text. In short, the findings reported in the paper are highly robust to different estimation methods and model specifications. The table reports the estimation results for 10-year Treasury, AAA and BAA bonds, according to different estimation procedures. The results in Columns 1, 3, and 5 are obtained by estimating a regression model for each forecaster and then aggregating the results via mean-group. Those in columns 2, 4, and 6 are obtained by estimating the model with the fixed effects. Finally, the figures in columns 3, 6, and 9 are obtained by augmenting the benchmark model with the surprise component of a large set of macroeconomic releases (Bloomberg News). Newey-West standard errors are used in the estimation. Sample: 1996q1-2015q1. The asterisks indicate the level of statistical significance: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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